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The assumption that positive affect leads to a better performance in simple cog-
nitive tasks has become well established. We address the question whether positive
and negative emotions differentially influence performance in complex problem-
solving in the same way. Emotions were induced by positive or negative feedback
in 74 participants who had to manage a computer-simulated complex problem-
solving scenario. Results show that overall scenario performance is not affected,
but positive and negative emotions elicit distinguishable problem-solving strate-
gies: Participants with negative emotions are more focused on the seeking and use
of information. We discuss methodological requirements for investigating emotion
influences in complex and dynamic cognitive tasks.
When mathematician Andrew Wiles claimed to have solved Fermat's last theorem, his
thorough attempt of proof was heavily criticised. But after an episode of distress he
brought about a cast-iron proof of this century-old mathematical problem. The history of
scientific endeavour often shows that feelings can influence our thinking in a beneficial or
harmful way. This issue brings about further questions: Which emotions are beneficial to
our problem-solving abilities and which emotions impair performance? In which tasks do
emotions generally exert an influence and why?
The present study addresses the effects of emotions on problem-solving in complex
and dynamic situations. In recent years, there has been growing interest in the role of
affect in cognitive processes (e.g., Fiedler, 2001; Schwarz, 2000). Yet, most empirical
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studies have focused solely on naturally occurring mood states rather than using
experimental manipulations of emotions, and have employed simple cognitive tasks
rather than more complex problem-solving situations. We investigate whether the
findings from studies on the influence of affect on simple cognitive tasks apply to
experimentally induced emotions in a complex cognitive task.
Theoretical rationale and research review
Complex problem-solving: When you do not know what to do. Complex problem-
solving (CPS) is often contrasted with simple cognitive tasks along five criteria (Frensch
& Funke, 1995; Funke, 2001): (1) complexity of the situation; (2) connectivity of
variables; (3) dynamic development of the situation; (4) intransparency or opaqueness;
and (5) polytely (pursue of multiple goals).
Simple problem-solving tasks, for example Duncker's (1945) candle task, Maier's
(1930) nine-dot problem, or the famous Tower of Hanoi (e.g., Simon, 1975), require
creative ingenuity and restructuring of given information. However, these tasks do not
reflect the complexity of real-life situations. In response to this criticism Broadbent
(1977) and DoÈrner (1980) proposed a new approach tailored to complex problems. Since
then, CPS has been studied extensively by means of computer-simulated scenarios (e.g.,
Lohhausen, Tailorshop, Biology Lab), constructed to reflect characteristics of real-life
problems (DoÈrner & Wearing, 1995; Funke, 2003). In the Lohhausen scenario, partici-
pants act as mayor of a small town and have to direct its economic and social situation.
This complex task demands the acquisition and integration of information, the elaboration
and attainment of goals, action-planning, decision-making, and self-management
(DoÈrner, 1986).
Emotions: When you know where your feelings come from. Emotions are commonly
understood as short-lived, intense phenomena that usually have a clear cognitive content
and a salient cause that is accessible to the person experiencing the emotion (e.g., Clore,
Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Moods, on the other hand,
are more global, diffuse, lack intentionality, are of longer duration and lower intensity
(e.g., Ekman, 1994; Schwarz, 1990).
Emotions and cognitive tasks: From simple to complex problem-solving. Previous
studies, employing a wide range of induction methods, demonstrate that moods and
emotions differentially influence strategic approaches and solution quality of simple
cognitive tasks. Positive affect leads to flexible and creative thinking (Fiedler, 2001; Isen,
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), and also facilitates efficient decision-making in more
complex environments (e.g., making a medical diagnosis; Isen, 2001). Individuals in a
positive affective state are more likely to use heuristic top-down processing strategies,
whereas negative affect facilitates careful bottom-up processing and a more systematic
gathering of information (Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000;
Schwarz, 1990, 2000).
Studies on CPS have concentrated on the influence of person variables, such as
perceived emotional intelligence, emotional resilience, emotional reactivity, uncertainty,
and anxiety as a trait (DoÈrner, 1998). The influence of stress, coping abilities, and
achievement motivation on CPS has also been investigated (Hesse, Spies, & LuÈer, 1983).
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Results are inconsistent: Some studies found that emotional variables impair complex
problem-solving, others detected no effect at all. The focus was almost solely on the
outcome of complex problem-solving tasks and the influence of emotional variables on
processing strategies was disregarded. Most importantly, emotional variables have not
been induced experimentally.
Overview of this study
We tested the influence of feedback-induced emotions on CPS. A computer-simulated
scenario was used to test complex problem-solving performance and behaviour. Two
hypotheses were tested. First, it is predicted that positive emotions, in contrast to negative
emotions, lead to a better performance in the scenario. Second, positive and negative
emotions should lead to different problem-solving behaviours: Positive emotions cause an
intuitive, hypothesis-oriented approach, whereas negative emotions are associated with
more detail-oriented, information-based behaviour.
METHOD
Measures
Emotion induction. A variety of induction techniques have been employed amongst
which music and films have been most successful (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse,
1996). We chose an induction method more relevant to the observers' task and elicited
positive and negative emotions experimentally by giving false (positive or negative)
feedback on performance twice throughout the experiment. The first feedback was
administered by telling students a false score after they had completed the spatial-
reasoning test, a subtest of the intelligence structure test 2000 (Intelligenz-Struktur-Test,
I-S-T 2000; Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, & Beauducel, 1999). The second feedback
was provided after half time of the computer-simulated scenario and was displayed
automatically in a pop-up window, which informed participants about their position in a
fictitious ranking (positive: ``You are in position 12 out of 250 and are thus better than
95.2% of all participants''; negative: ``You are in position 208 out of 250. That means
that 83.2% of all participants have performed better than you''.).
Emotion measures. Emotions were measured seven times using a 14-item paper-
and-pencil test. Participants had to mark a 10 cm line between the two poles null and all
pervasive for each of 14 emotion adjectives (content, sad, excited, tense, confused, angry,
anxious, surprised, enthusiastic, interested, calm, happy, ashamed, proud) that were put in
random order. Emotion scores were derived from a factor analysis yielding three factors
that retained all items. The three factors, as defined by high-loading items, were
``negative emotions'' (angry, anxious, ashamed, sad, confused), ``positive emotions''
(enthusiastic, happy, interested, calm, proud, content), and ``arousal'' (tense, excited,
surprised). Three single emotion scores, representing the three factors, were calculated by
aggregating participants' ratings (ranging from 0 to 10) on each item. These derived
scores were used for further analysis.
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Complex problem-solving. The computer-simulated scenario FSYS 2.0 (Wagener,
2001) was used in the current study.1 Problem solvers had to manage a forest enterprise
over a period of 50 months (simulation cycles) at a profit. They had to plant, grow, and
cut down trees in five structurally equivalent forest partitions and maintain the wood's
quality (e.g., fertilise grounds, do pest control). The scenario is based on DoÈrner's (1986)
model of demands on problem solvers, and indicates strategies in different aspects of
problem-solving behaviour additionally to the overall success in controlling the system.
FSYS scales are organised in four dimensions: scenario performance (SP), quality of
measures (QM), acquisition of information (AI), and self-management (SM). We focused
on the dimensions SP, QM, and AI, and used the following scales as dependent variables:
1. Total capital earned (SP): Account balance plus value of forest after 50 cycles
2. Error prevention (QM): Correct dosage of measures (e.g., fertiliser, pesticide)
3. Assigning of priorities (QM): Adequateness of decisions in goal conflicts
4. Efficiency of actions (QM): Total vs. partial achievement of subgoals
5. Early comprehension (QM): Time when each possible measure was ordered once
6. Early orientation (AI): Number of text elements accessed in first five cycles
7. Information before acting (AI): Knowledge acquisition by reading texts before acting
8. Reading statistics (AI): Gaining overview of business by reading figures
9. Continuous surveying (AI): Continuity of inspection of forest partitions
High scores on any of the QM-scales, especially regarding early comprehension and
prioritising, are assumed to be due to a more hypothesis-oriented behaviour, triggered by
positive emotions. High scores on AI-scales are hypothesised to be related to a more
information-oriented approach, triggered by negative emotions.
For the 90 minute duration of the test session, the program records and calculates the
individual's performance data with regard to the overall profit yielded and behavioural
components on the chosen scales that were later analysed separately.
Additional measures. Personal data (e.g., age, gender, subject of studies) were
collected at the end of the experiment on a short standardised questionnaire that also
asked for feedback on the experiment and any inconveniences that might have disrupted
the procedure. No such influences were reported.
Participants and procedure
Participants were 74 undergraduate and graduate students (n = 32 female, n = 42 male)
mean age M = 24.6 years (SD = 2.89) of the University of Heidelberg, Germany.
Participation was rewarded with partial credit for a course requirement or the gift of a
book. The experiment took place in the Department of Psychology at the University of
Heidelberg, Germany.
1 The computer-simulated scenario FSYS 2.0 (Wagener, 2001) and related materials are available
in English on CD-ROM. The scenario can be obtained on request from Dietrich Wagener, at the
University of Mannheim, Lehrstuhl fuÈr Psychologie II, Schloss, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany;
e-mail: dw@tnt.psychologie.uni-mannheim.de
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions (positive or
negative feedback or a control group with no feedback), distributed equally with n = 24
subjects in each of the treatment groups and n = 26 subjects in the control group. The
students were then tested individually. They first had to complete the spatial-reasoning
test and were then given the written instructions for the computer-simulated scenario.
Subsequently, emotions were induced by giving false feedback on the spatial-reasoning
test score. Emotions were measured directly before and after the feedback. Next, parti-
cipants worked on the scenario FSYS for 90 minutes. Every tenth cycle, a pop-up window
instructed participants to complete another emotion questionnaire. After the 25th cycle,
the second feedback was given automatically in a pop-up window. Emotions were
measured immediately afterwards. The instructions and the procedure were highly
standardised. At the end of the experiments, participants received veridical feedback
about their performance in the spatial-reasoning test and scenario.
RESULTS
Manipulation check: How good was the emotion elicitation? A series of ANOVAs
were carried out on the three emotion scales (positive, negative, arousal) with feedback
(positive, negative, control) as a factor for all time points in which emotions were
measured. The emotion induction had a substantial effect on emotions in the expected
direction only directly after the feedback was given. The second induction was more
effective than the first. Treatment effects were more pronounced on positive and negative
emotions than on arousal. Because we do not further analyse the possible effects of
arousal on problem-solving performance, we refrain from reporting treatment effects on
that scale here. Table 1 provides means and standard deviations of positive and negative
emotion ratings at relevant time points with inferential statistics for participants who
received positive, negative, or no feedback.
Positive emotions were significantly increased by the first positive, and decreased by
the first negative feedback in comparison to the control group. The second feedback had
an even more substantial effect on positive emotions. Negative emotions were changed
accordingly only by the second feedback, but not by the first one. We conclude that the
treatments were effective in eliciting emotions in the expected directions.
TABLE 1
Means and standard deviations of emotion ratings directly after first and second
feedback for three treatment groups (N = 74) with F-test results
First treatment Second treatment
Positive Negative Control F(2, 71) Positive Negative Control F(2, 71)
Positive 5.1 (2.4) 3.3 (1.7) 4.2 (1.7) 5.10** 5.4 (2.8) 2.5 (1.9) 3.7 (1.8) 10.38**
Negative 1.9 (1.8) 1.8 (1.4) 1.6 (1.5) 0.24 1.6 (1.3) 3.9 (2.6) 2.1 (1.7) 9.83***
** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Do emotions influence the outcome of complex problem solving? To test the
assumption that positive emotions facilitate and negative emotions impair scenario
performance, a one-way ANOVA was carried out with feedback as a factor. Surprisingly,
induced emotions do not differentially affect scenario performance (positive: M = 62.7,
SD = 23.8, negative: M = 63.2, SD = 18.3, control: M = 60.8, SD = 24.9), F(2, 71) = 0.08,
n.s.
Creative vs. careful processing: Do positive and negative emotions direct
strategies? We further tested whether positive and negative emotions lead to different
information-processing modes. A series of ANOVA was computed on QM-scales (quality
of measures) and AI-scales (acquisition of information) with feedback as a factor. Table 2
provides performance data on the scenario scales and results of the omnibus F-tests for
participants who received positive, negative, or no feedback.
Performance data do not differ significantly between treatment groups on any of the
QM-scales and most AI-scales. Although negatively induced participants show higher
means on AI-scales ``Early orientation'' and ``Information before acting'' relative to
positively induced participants and controls, these differences do not reach statistical
significance. The significant difference on the AI-scale ``Continuous surveying'', on the
other hand, can be due to higher means in both treatment groups, as compared to controls.
Following the ANOVA, we conducted planned comparisons to precisely test the
predictions with regard to the influence of positive emotions on QM-scales, and negative
emotions on AI-scales. For QM-scales, a primary orthogonal contrast compared the
positive induction group with the combined control and negative induction group
TABLE 2
Means and standard deviations of performance on QM- and AI-scales in FSYS for three
treatment groups (N = 74) with results of the omnibus F-test, and two orthogonal
contrastsa
FSYS-scales Emotion induction ANOVA Contrasts
1 2
Error prevention (QM) 77.9 (14.3) 78.1 (10.7) 73.4 (16.9) 0.86 70.62 71.14
Assigning priorities (QM) 81.2 (8.8) 78.6 (10.6) 78.5 (9.1) 0.60 71.09 70.05
Efficiency of action (QM) 75.7 (6.8) 75.5 (6.6) 75.4 (7.9) 0.14 70.16 70.04
Early comprehension (QM) 84.2 (7.0) 83.1 (8.7) 86.7 (4.4) 1.79 0.40 1.84
Early orientation (AI) 39.3 (24.5) 56.0 (30.1) 40.2 (25.5) 2.99{ 72.45* 0.11
Information before acting (AI) 50.9 (20.0) 65.0 (20.8) 57.3 (22.5) 2.68 72.08* 1.08
Reading statistics (AI) 2.6 (3.4) 1.8 (2.4) 1.7 (2.7) 0.71 0.54 71.07
Continuous surveying (AI) 61.3 (9.8) 62.2 (13.6) 54.2 (11.4) 3.57* 71.53 72.16*
a Contrasts 1 and 2 refer to two planned orthogonal contrasts. 1.Main contrast: Positive treatment
group against combined negative treatment and control group (QM-scales, first four rows); negative
treatment group against combined positive treatment and control group (AI-scales, last four rows). 2.
Follow-up contrast: negative treatment group agaisnt control group (QM), positive treatment group
against control group (AI).
* p < .05. { p = .05.
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(contrast 1), and a follow-up contrast compared the negative induction and control group
(contrast 2). For AI-scales, the negative induction group was compared with the com-
bined control and positive induction group (contrast 1), and the positive induction group
with the control group (contrast 2). The results of the planned comparisons are presented
in the last two columns of Table 2.
The planned comparison analyses did not affect our findings related to the QM-scales.
However, the primary contrast was found to be significant for the AI-scales ``Early
orientation'' and ``Information before acting''. These results suggest that negatively
induced participants are considerably more thorough in their information search during
the first five scenario cycles and are also more likely to gather information before acting.
We found a significant follow-up contrast for the scale ``Continuous surveying'' between
the positive induction group and the control group. An additional contrast between the
negative induction group and the control group for this scale was also significant t(71) =
72.42, p < .05. This finding demonstrates that, in contrast to our predictions, the sig-
nificant F-test result for this scale is due to higher means for both treatment groups,
positive and negative, relative to the control group.
Overall, the significant effects of emotion induction on scenario performance and
behaviour are rather selective. Note that conducting multiple F-tests might increase the
chance of Type I error. However, we observed a significant tendency for negatively
induced participants to be more information-oriented in their behaviour on more than one
AI-scale. We therefore conclude that the significant effects in this study are meaningful.
DISCUSSION
Emotions do not influence complex problem-solving. Positive and negative emotions
did not differentially influence scenario performance. This unexpected result is
inconsistent with most previous studies on simple problem-solving (e.g., Isen, 2001)
and could originate from an inefficient treatment. However, the manipulation check
demonstrated that both treatments elicited emotions in the expected direction. Three other
issues are related to the question of treatment efficiency: (a) the intensity and duration of
evoked emotions, (b) the influence of labelling state emotions, and (c) the attention that
individuals pay to affective cues and the perceived relevance of emotions. Considering
the first point, differences in emotions were only significant directly after the treatment
was given. Induced emotions might not have lasted long enough to cause substantial
differences in scenario performance. To the second point, labelling state emotions can
reduce their impact on cognitive processes (Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993). Emotions
have been measured seven times throughout the experiment in order to gain information
about the duration of the treatment effects and the stability of emotions. Based on the
findings of Keltner et al. (1993), it is possible that the number of emotion questionnaires
applied in this study caused an unwanted reduction of emotion influence on measurable
cognitive processes. Concerning the third point, attention to emotions, Gasper and Clore
(2000) found that the perception of the relevance of affective cues influences the use of
emotions as a basis for judgement. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis
(Schwarz, 1990), affect influences cognitive processes only when it is experienced as a
source of relevant information. We presume that participants in our study valued
emotional states as relevant, because emotions were induced by performance feedback
directly relevant to the task. Yet, we did not control whether and how often individuals
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actually attended to their emotions. We suspect that some students rarely noticed their
feelings, let alone considered their feelings as a useful source of information.
Three conclusions can be drawn from these considerations. First, other emotion eli-
citation methods (i.e., inducement by music, pictures, or odours) might well prove to be
more efficient, but they are only reasonable when they do not interfere with the
requirements of the task. Alternatively, performance feedback could have been applied
after each cycle. As problematic as this might be, a sustained treatment could also
prohibit effects of scenario-inherent feedback (such as graphical process information) on
performance. Second, the efficiency and duration of the treatment should be tested
beforehand and questionnaires should be omitted in the main experiment to prevent a
possible reduction of effects. Third, a variety of measures have been developed to assess
individual differences in emotional attention and monitoring (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2000;
Otto, DoÈring-Seipel, Grebe, & Lantermann, 2001). We think it advisable to measure
emotional attention and clarity as well as emotional stability as traits, especially in a
demanding complex problem-solving situation. This leads to another explanation of our
findings that is related to the nature of the task. The computer-simulated scenario FSYS
constitutes a complex, challenging situation for the problem solver. Students might have
regulated their emotions or focused more on the cognitive task than on their own feelings.
Individuals with negative emotions are well-informed problem solvers. There is a
tendency showing that positive and negative emotions elicited distinguishable problem-
solving strategies: As predicted by Fiedler's (2001) affect-cognition model, negative
emotions led to a more detailed information search and to a more systematic approach to
the scenario, especially during the first five cycles. The differences on the scale for early
orientation in the first five months can be assumed to be a direct cause of the first
treatment. As far as the effect of treatment on complex problem-solving behaviour is
concerned, it can be concluded that Fiedler's model at least partly applies to emotions in
CPS.
It can be inferred that emotions influence CPS on the level of information acquisition.
One possible conclusion is that different emotion-induced strategies for CPS lead to the
same result in the scenario FSYS. On the one hand, the problem solver has to be well
informed and can thus benefit from negative emotions. On the other hand, quick and
flexible decision-making is requiredÐan approach that is basically elicited by positive
emotion. It is probably the switching between different strategies (elicited by both,
positive and negative emotions) that accounts for success in complex problem-solving.
From this assumption we draw the conclusion that the dichotomy between positive and
negative emotions does not necessarily lead to a classification of successful and unsuc-
cessful problem solvers in complex tasks.
Outlook
Many aspects of the results demonstrate that studying emotions within the research
domain of CPS requires a different approach from analysing the effects of induced
emotions on simple cognitive processes. Future research should concentrate on the for-
mation and effect of different problem-solving strategies on behaviour in complex tasks
rather than on emotion influences on overall success. Considering the attention to clarity
and repair of emotions as moderating trait aspects (Otto et al., 2001) might enhance the
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understanding of emotion influences on cognitive processes in complex tasks. Moreover,
as the affect-cognition link is not unidirectional, we can assume that perceived success or
failure in FSYS might have triggered emotions at any time throughout the scenario.
Either, emotions have to be induced each cycle or postcognitive emotions have to be
controlled by means of process-tracing methods. The comparison of precise emotions of
the same valence has already been attempted (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000), and further
effort should be made to induce specific emotions purposefully.
Finally, Mellers and colleagues have offered a decision-affect theory of anticipated
emotions that takes the emotional responses to the outcome of choice into account (e.g.,
Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). Decision-affect theory provides a descriptive account
of actual emotions and would allow an examination of connections between anticipated
emotions, strategy selection in CPS, and actual emotional responses. It might also be
possible to differentiate between distinct emotions in order to answer the normative
question whether people should actually employ emotions as a relevant parameter to
guide their behaviour in complex situations.
Manuscript received 12 December 2002
Revised manuscript received 10 August 2005
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